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Abstract 
 
Many know how Apple Inc. owes its success in Mobile Commerce to the introduction of the new 
“App Store” business model. This new market is characterized by the opening to third party mobile 
apps, which are distributed to consumers through the App Store. This paper investigates factors that 
might influence the pricing of applications in the Apple Mobile Application Store.  
By reviewing the existing literature on the issue and analyzing the strategic features characterizing 
the App Store, we detect three main factors that could influence prices for apps, that is the number 
of developed apps, the presence of two-sided network externalities and developer’s specialization.  
An empirical analysis on data from 68,220 apps downloaded from the Italian App Store is used to 
test the hypotheses. Regression results support our hypotheses. We argue, that even if the research 
here presented can be considered as a started analysis to the pricing problem in such markets, this 
work may have important managerial implication for the thousands of developers that are 
competing in this emerging market. 
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1.Introduction: Mobile Commerce and the new application store model 
 
 
There is not a unique definition of Mobile Commerce (or, as some scholars identify it, Mobile e-
Commerce): it could be defined as the electronic commerce over mobile devices (Anckar and 
D’Incau, 2002) or alternatively as the product resulting from the interaction among business 
transactions, Internet applications and mobile communications (Grami and Schell 2004). Other 
definitions, such as the one in Muller-Veerse (1999), focus on enabling business transactions 
through wireless devices; on the other hand, Tarasewich et al. (2002) focus on the potential 
commercial transaction conducted through communications networks interfacing with wireless (or 
mobile) devices. 
Regardless definitions, Mobile Commerce is still an emerging market, with very high growth 
potential, but also difficult to manage. 
In the early 2000s the context was dominated by the Mobile Portal model, which became a common 
entry point to mobile Internet. Mobile portals have assumed several forms as a service provider 
portals, such as Vodafone’s Live portal, or alternatively being public pure play sites that provided 
some kind of managed access to resources using a yellow pages approach (Parsons 2007). 
Mobile Portals were the foundation of the Mobile Commerce value chain: they represented the key 
business-to-consumer market makers on the mobile Internet (Barnes 2002) and they were mostly 
managed and strongly controlled by Mobile Network Operators (MNO). These last players created 
these business models in order to face the decline of voice services marginality and average revenue 
per user (MacKenzie 2000) by increasing the revenues coming from alternative non-voice services 
(Ghezzi, Rangone 2010). 
Exploiting their main strategic asset, i.e. the Mobile Network infrastructure, the MNOs constructed 
a high-centralized model (Kuo and Yu 2006) that allowed them to increase or consolidate their 
market power (Palomaki 2004, Parsons 2007, CNET News 2001). 
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This relative stable context was dramatically shaken by the launch, in 2008, of the Apple App Store, 
that has introduced a new distribution paradigm in Mobile Commerce. 
An Application Store is a web site, accessible from mobile devices, from which it is possible to 
download mobile software applications that run on the same mobile devices, increasing the utility 
that consumers associate them. The mobile applications are built by third software developers, 
which sell their products on the Application Store by using the last as distribution channel to reach 
market end users. 
Ghezzi and Rangone (2010) have emphasized how Apple, deploying a strategy based on leveraging 
on strong assets like its brand reputation and its innovative iPhone device launch, has been able to 
shock the traditional context.  
The real innovation of the Application Store distribution paradigm consists in the translation of 
traditional software libraries or e-marketplaces business models, in the Mobile context; learning 
from the business model characterizing NTT DoCoMo (Japan’s leading mobile operator) 
environment (iMode model) and leveraging new smart phones features and capabilities, Apple Inc. 
was able to increase the spread of Mobile apps for its devices in order to obtain higher market 
power on the main devices market. 
According to Hagiu (2007) we could classify this model as a two-sided platform that generates a 
mutual advantage mechanism: by means of third parties’ apps, Apple can exploit indirect network 
externalities (Gandal 1995, Shapiro and Varian 1999, Baraldi 2004) that increase the value of its 
own devices (iPhone, iPod touch and iPad). In fact, the higher the number of apps in App Store, the 
higher is the potential functions of Apple’s devices. On the other side, developers are interested to 
sell their apps through App Store, because it allows them to reach many consumers in a global wide 
market. 
In the Apple’s model, the revenue from paid applications are split 70/30: developers can retain 70% 
of the revenues from their applications, while Apple keeps the other 30%. 
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Such business model is quite common in video games industry (Rochet e Tirole, 2002) and, as 
matter of fact, it was introduced by Sony with the PlayStation; indeed, in that case, Sony was 
interested to encourage the development of many compatible games, in order to increase the real 
value of the platform. Many scholars have analyzed this market, emphasizing as in video games 
console platforms the consumers are the subsidized side (Rochet e Tirole, 2002, Evans e 
Schmalense, 2007), in order to exploit inter-market externalities. 
Anyway, for our scope, the most important issue is the consideration that App Store gives a great 
opportunity to the apps developers, which could reach consumers in a global market, without 
managing distribution context. According to Gartner forecast (Gartner 2010) consumers are 
expected to spend $ 6.2 billion at mobile application stores in 2010, and the worldwide downloads 
to overpass 21.6 billion by 2013, generating more than $ 29 billion in revenue. 
Furthermore we need to highlight how the great success achieved by App Store has caused the 
imitation by Apple’s competitors, which have launched other similar Application Portal, such as 
Ovi Store by Nokia, Samsung Apps and the Android Market.  
This imitation strategy, if on one side can increase the business opportunities for developers, on the 
other side might increase the development costs for the same; the spread of Application Stores 
generates several interesting strategic issues for mobile apps developers. 
 
2. Research motivation: application store model and the pricing of the apps  
 
During the last two years, the attention of scholars to Application Store business model is 
significantly increased, but no scientific papers have produced, so far, an empirical analysis 
investigating the principal drivers influencing the pricing of apps in this kind of market. 
Some scholars have explored the current trends under a developers’ perspective (Holzer & Ondrus 
2010); others have focused their attention on the dramatic change of the strategic environment and 
market’s structure brought by the Application Store model (Ghezzi, Rangone 2010). 
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Our focus is indeed on investing price strategies in this market and specifically to understand what 
factors influence the price of mobile applications and, consequently, how developers can obtain 
high prices in the Application Store business model. 
The issue is very interesting, not only to evaluate the profitability of the mobile applications market, 
but also to make a comparison with the previous MNO’s Portals model. 
Buellingen and Woerter (2004) have noticed as, in MNO Portals, the application developers had a 
particular demanding role: their products enabled mobile portal provider to increase customer 
satisfaction, nevertheless they were not able to increase their importance in Mobile Commerce 
Value Chain.  
Then, a very interesting question is whether the new Application Store model increases the business 
opportunity for mobile content developers. In this sense, it might be very enlightening to investigate 
pricing strategies and factors influencing prices in such business models. 
Indeed, the “pricing of the apps” is a very interesting problem for a developer, because today 
Application Stores are populated by thousands of apps, many of which are free. Nevertheless, many 
developers sell their apps with prices consistently higher than the average price. 
Since today Apple App Store is the more famous and the more used Application Store, we focus 
our study on this market.  
The Apple App Store can be regarded as a free entering digital market with high level of 
competition. Barrier to entry are relatively low for this market and the result is that we have located, 
at least in the Italian Apple Store, 24,316 of developer and 68,220 of Apps. Once a developer has 
developed an application, their marginal costs are zero, since the product can be downloaded by 
users a zero cost for the developer. Actually, this is a very common feature for digital goods and it 
has a remarkable influence on pricing; Shapiro and Varian (1999) argue how providers of digital 
goods can create turnover by selling large quantity of products at relatively low prices. They also 
emphasize the strategic role of third-degree price discrimination, i.e. setting different prices for 
certain customer groups or product features. 
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In a very interesting music-online customer survey, Bauxmann et al. (2005) have distinguished 
between four categories of songs (Current Hits, Older Title, Rarities and Newcomer) demonstrating 
as the willingness to pay of the consumer is different for each of these. In particular, most of the 
survey’s participant would not to pay more than $ 0.99 for digital music, with the only exception for 
the Rarities. So the authors suggest setting lower prices in order to maximize the profit through 
higher number of downloads per song (Bauxmann et al.2005, 2007). 
Shiller and Waldfoegel (2009) have argued as, for digital music, third degree price discrimination 
based on available observable criteria does not raise revenue significantly. 
Actually, price discrimination is not very practiced in on line music and multimedia stores; the same 
Apple, with its iTunes store, exploit its bargaining power to set uniform and indiscriminate price 
($0.99 per song, $1.99 per TV series episode, $9.99 and $14.99 per movie downloaded).  
Apple’s point, concerning price discrimination, is that having a unified, easy-to-use interface, as 
well as a very simple pricing scheme, is critical to attracting consumers to the iTunes store (Hagiu 
2007).  
Apple wants to reach the same objective with App Store, in order to increase the sales of its devices, 
but some particular features related to the software market and the development risk issues, make 
the pricing  in this market quite different than in digital music one. 
Referring to the same framework introduced by Hagiu (2007), we associate App Store to a pure 
two-sided platform of digital apps, because, differently than iTunes, the price of the apps is chosen 
by developers. The different pricing policy adopted by Apple in this case, is probably due to the 
need of encourage the development of applications that can increase the value of the platform and, 
at last, the value of the Cupertino’s devices.  
Apple allows the developer to be the residual claimant of the revenues derived from the app and 
extract some royalty payments in order to deal with its own incentives to expand the user market for 
devices. In this way, apps developers internalize the benefits assured by investments in higher 
quality and/or lesser costs and, simultaneously, Apple can focus on the main market. 
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Anyway, the most important issue we want emphasize is how pricing policy is deeply different 
between digital music goods and mobile apps, and this raises the interest on the issue. 
So, what are the determinants for making price decision in this market? Are there some significant 
factors influencing the price of apps? We have conjointly analyzed the App Store interface and 
several literature references in order to formulate some hypotheses. 
The organization of this paper is as it follows: next section provides a literature review aims at 
formulating some hypotheses about pricing in this market. Section 4 reports about the data used to 
perform the econometric analysis. Section 5 then describes the regression model and the results of 
the analysis. Finally, conclusions are discussed in Section 6. 
 
3. Theoretical background and hypotheses formulation 
 
By analyzing the existing literature and the strategic aspects of App Store, we have detected three 
main factors that might be used by developers in order to obtain higher prices. These factors are, in 
order, the degree of the developer’s proliferation, the degree of developer’s specialization and 
the app’s thematic category.  
As we have emphasized in the introduction, Mobile Commerce literature is poor of empirical 
pricing analysis and there are not previous econometric models investigating factors influencing the 
price of mobile apps. 
Then we analyzed several literature branches that we think can be reasonable associated to the 
above three factors, interpreting them in a Mobile Commerce perspective. 
 
3.1 The degree of the developer’s proliferation 
By analyzing the application store business model we assume that product proliferation is a winning 
strategy in such market. This is due to the visibility rules common applied in such a market. Indeed, 
every time a user opens a descriptive page about a given application, all the apps built by the same 
developer are showed. So the higher the number of apps, the higher the probability that one generic 
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user can downloads one developer’s app. Furthermore, since App Store advertises last applications 
release, the more apps are released the higher is the probability a developer gets a download. 
Brand or product proliferation strategy has been widely analyzed, especially in Food Industries, and 
several scholars have demonstrated as a high number of products might allow to increase market 
prices; Putsis (1997) finds that an increase in the number of brands, increases the ability of national 
brand manufacturers to raise price. In addition, it is recognized as a broad product lines can deter 
entry (Schmalensee 1978, Brander and Eaton 1984, Bonanno 1987) thereby allowing an incumbent 
to raise its market prices (Benson 1990, Levy and Reitzes 1993, Putsis 1997).  
Then, it is reasonable to hypothesize how such a strategy might be winning one also in mobile 
software industry, where the market is growing (Gartner 2010) and where the distribution is 
delegate to big new portals like App Store, which counts thousands of apps.  
Consequently we have hypothesized a relation between the developer’s proliferation degree and the 
apps prices, that is: 
 
H1: The higher the developer’s concentration degree, the higher the price of developer’s apps. 
 
3.2 The degree of developer’s specialization 
Daniels and al. defines the degree of specialization as the degree to which player should focus 
efforts in terms of the width of product lines, the target segments, and the geographical market 
served (Daniels et al. 2009). In a recent survey on the videogame industry, Langlotz et al. (2008), 
highlights how the degree of specialization is an important competitive strategy in such an industry. 
For example, they highlight how Nintendo console incorporates a low specialization in hardware 
and a high specialization on the software side. However, in the application store market, developers 
can rely only on software specialization to improve their competitive position and setting higher 
prices. Also, in this industry, specialization is related with reputation, since the more a developer is 
specialized on a given thematic area the higher its reputation in developing goods product. The idea 
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that reputation can be very important in order to set higher prices, also in electronic commerce, has 
been confirmed in a very interesting work by Melnik and Alm (2002). In their work, the authors 
demonstrate how seller reputation is an important driver for setting higher prices in on-line auctions 
such as e-Bay. Furthermore, Banerjee and Duflo (2000) have highlighted how reputation, in 
software industry, allows to raise contracts value.  
Following the above reasoning the can hypothesize a relation between the degree of specialization 
of a developer and the possibility to set higher prices; so we express this relation through the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H2: The higher the developer’s specialization degree, the higher the price of developer’s apps. 
 
3.3 The apps’ thematic category  
The third hypothesis is about the presence of thematic categories showing network externalities 
more than others. Actually we argue that the pricing of some categories of apps could be influenced 
by Two-Sided Network effects; the presence of these externalities means that a firm could decide to 
give away free products on a specific market with the purpose to obtain higher profits on another, 
correlated, market (Rochet and Tirole 2002, Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005).  We have noticed such 
kind of behavior in some App Store thematic categories, such as Social Networking, Games, News 
and Lifestyle. In fact apps belonging to these categories are characterized by the presence of in-app 
advertising or free trial lite versions, which are two cases cited by Parker and Van Alstyne (2005). 
Indeed, it is quite known how many firms give away new-limited version but charge for a 
professional version. In some App Store categories this strategy is frequent, especially in Games 
category. The focal point of this approach is that the lite version encourages experimentation and 
purchase of the complete version. This is probably because, also for famous games titles, there is 
the need to prove the product in a new technology platform, such as Apple’s devices. 
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On the other hand, in case of free apps with alternative revenue sources there is the exploitation of 
externalities between consumers and advertisers (Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005); indeed, the higher 
is the number of consumers, the higher is the advertisers’ willingness to pay. This is a quite 
common phenomenon, traditionally analyzed in News and Media industry (Kaiser and Wright 2005, 
Ferrando et al. 2003), in which the inter-market network externalities cause a price competition on 
consumers market, in order to obtain higher profits on the advertising market. We really think this 
approach is very used also in App Store, especially for “Social Networking”, “Lifestyle” and 
“News” apps.   
So for categories enjoying “two side network externalities”, that is Games, Social Network, 
Entertainment, Lifestyle and New, we hypothesize the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: The price of apps falling in “two side network externality” categories is lower than in other 
categories. 
 
4. The dataset  
 
The data used test our hypotheses consist of records collected by means of  “Browse Feature” in the 
Italian App Store. They refer to all existing apps to July 2010 and they account for 68,220 records 
containing information about name of the app, name of the developer, thematic category and price 
of the app. We have arranged these data in a database, in order to obtain some useful queries that 
enabled our analysis. In order to test our hypothesis we have developed proper measure of the 
degree of developers’ proliferation and specialization, while for hypothesis three we have used the 
20 thematic categories in the App Store. 
 
4.1 A measure for the degree of developers’ proliferation 
 
There are 24,316 developers in our dataset; in order to measure the developers’ proliferation we 
have ranked the developers on the base of the number of apps present in the dataset. In particular, 
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we have divided developers into three classes, A, B, C, on the base of a Pareto analysis performed 
on the number of apps developed by each developer.  
So, by indicating with DP the degree of developers’ proliferation, it can assume the following 
values: 
• A; it means Class A developers, i.e. is the set of developers that, all together, collects the 
70% of total apps. 
• B; it means Class B developers, i.e. is the set of developers that, all together, collects 
another 20% of total apps. 
• C; Class C developers, i.e. is the set of developers that, all together, collects the remaining 
10% of total apps. 
Therefore, we have assumed these classes being a proxy of the degree of proliferation of 
developers. 
The Pareto Analysis has showed that 6,885, i.e. about the 28% of the total, collects the 70% of the 
apps present in the dataset.  
 
4.2 A measure for the degree of  developers’ specialization 
 
We have measured the degree of developers’ specialization with the concentration of the apps in 
each of 20 thematic categories in App Store. 
In order to do that we have standardized the number of apps each developer has produced in each 
category. By doing this we have obtained a standardized distribution for each thematic categories, 
that is a distribution with mean equal to 0 and standard deviation equal to 1. 
Then we have used the following classification for each developer j and category i: 
• The developer j is not specialized in the i-th category if the standardized number of apps 
produced by j in the category i is less than 1 (i.e. lower than the standard deviation). 
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• The developer j is weakly specialized in the i-th category if the standardized number of apps 
produced by j in the category i is  between 1 and 3 (i.e. less the three time the standard 
deviation). 
• The developer j is strongly specialized in the i-th category if the standardized number of 
apps produced by j in the category i is greater than 3 (i.e. more than three time the standard 
deviation). 
Then, by indicating with DS the degree of developer specialization, it can assume the following 
values:  
• S; it stands for strongly specialized developer, that is a developer showing at least one 
strong specialization in any thematic category, according to the previous classification. 
• W; it stands for weakly specialized developer, that is a developer showing at least one weak 
specialization in any thematic category, according to the previous classification 
• N; it stands for not specialized developer, that is a developer showing no specialization. 
 
5. The Econometric analysis 
 
5.1 The model 
 
In order to test the above hypotheses we have used a Generalized Linear Model (GZLM) as 
reported in expression (1), in which all the variables are dummy assuming value “0” if the factor 
level is false, and “1” if it is true.   !"#$%! = ! + !! !! + !! !! + !!   !!    + !! !! + !! !! + !! !! +!! !"#$%&##! +!! !"#$#%&! + !! !ℎ!"!#$%&ℎ!! +!! !"#$%! + !! !"#$%#&'"($"#! + !! !"#$%&'()! +!! !""#$! + !! !"#$%&'! +!! !"#$ℎ!"! + !!" !"#$%&'($! + !!! !"#$%! + !!" !"#$%"&$'(! + !!" !"#$! +!!" !!"#$%&'('&)! + !!" !"#"$"%&" + !!" !"#$%ℎ!"#$&!"#$%&& +!!" !"#$%&'()*"+,$-.! + !!" !"#$%&! + !!" !"#$#"#%&! + !!" !"#$%&! +   !!                 (1) 
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Since there are many free of charge apps, we have used a Tweedie regression model, that is a 
particular kind of GZLM, resulting very appropriate when the dependent variable has many 0 
values, and the overall distribution has a positive skew (Garson, Gilchrist and Drinkwater 2000). 
So, in our model, the dependent variable is   !"#$%!, i.e. a metric variable which represents the price 
of the i-th app, while the independents variable are DP assuming value A and B, DS assuming 
values S and W and the 20 thematic categories in App Store. 
 
4.2 Results 
 
Table 1 reports statistics about the price of apps in the Italian App Store. As the reader can notice, 
the average price is quite low as expected, since 27,942 apps are free. However, is quite surprising 
that the price range is quite large, since the  maximum price is 719.99€ and it is related to a video 
surveillance app. 
 
Table 1: Dependent variable statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Price 68,220 .00 719.99 1.59 6.51 
 
The regression model appraisal has been conducted through the omnibus test and the test of model 
effect. 
As reported in Table 2, the likelihood ratio in the "omnibus test" table is a function of the difference 
in likelihood values between the chosen model and the model with the intercept only (the null 
model). Since the likelihood ratio is significant, we conclude that the coefficients in the model are 
different from 0 and the model can be accepted.   
Instead, the “tests of model effects” table reports Wald chi-square tests for the null hypothesis that 
none of the parameter estimates (b coefficients) for a predictor are different from 0 (a finding of 
significance means that at least one of the parameter estimates is significant). As showed in Table 3 
(where the column Df stands for Degree of freedom for the Wald test) all variables in our model 
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result statistically significant. Finally, Table 4 reports the parameter estimates (significance: *<.10 
and **<.05). 
 
Table 2: Omnibus test result 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square Degree of freedom Sig. 
29896.529 23 0.000 
 
Table 3: Test of model effects 
Source Wald Chi-Square Df Sig. 
Intercept 44141.213 1 .000 
DP 49.381 2 .000 
DS 602.444 2 .000 
Thematic Categories 16157.911 19 .000 
 
 
Table 4: Parameter Estimates 
Parameter B Std. Error Sig. 
Intercept 1.610 .0194 .000 
DP = C -.092 .0151 .000** 
DP = B -.011 .0129 .402 
DP = A 0 . . 
DS = N -.362 .0165 .000** 
DS = W -.243 .0112 .000** 
DS = S 0 . . 
Category = Business 1.049 .0440 .000** 
Category = Finance .892 .0526 .000** 
Category = Photography .008 .0304 .793 
Category = Games -.614 .0217 .000** 
Category = Entertainment -.768 .0217 .000** 
Category = Education .202 .0311 .000** 
Category = Books .064 .0286 .025* 
Category = Medical 4.127 .0792 .000** 
Category = Weather -.524 .0438 .000** 
Category = Lifestyle -.585 .0250 .000** 
Category = Music -.039 .0265 .136 
Category = Navigation 2.526 .0574 .000** 
Category = News -.850 .0247 .000** 
Category = Productivity .465 .0359 .000** 
Category = Reference 1.107 .0557 .000** 
Category = Healthcare & Fitness .110 .0308 .000** 
Category = Social Networking -.727 .0265 .000** 
Category = Sports .145 .0301 .000** 
Category = Utilities -.364 .0237 .000** 
Category = Travel 0 . . 
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As clarified in Table 4, the last level of each category is automatically set to zero (reference level), 
so that the B value can be interpreted as the price variation when each category varies from the 
reference level. 
The results obtained from the regression analysis are consistent with the hypotheses formulated. 
Regarding hypothesis 1, H1, we can see how the lower is degree of proliferation (DP), the lower is 
the price, more precisely the results show how the price differential between Class A developers 
and Class C developers is equal to 0.092 €. Therefore, H1 is confirmed by our analysis. 
Regarding hypothesis 2, H2, we notice how the lower is the degree of specialization, the lower are 
prices. In particular, when moving from strong specialized, S, to not-specialized, N, we get a price 
differential of 0.362€. So also H2 is full confirmed. 
Finally, in order to verify hypothesis H3, we have ranked the 20 thematic categories according to 
their price respect the reference level (Travel); of course, this rank is obtained according to the 
result of the regression analysis (the B value in table 4).  
As the reader can notice from the analysis of Table 5, the last categories in term of price are those 
we have hypothesized showing the two-side network externality effect. So even H3 is full 
confirmed. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper analyzes pricing strategies in the App Store market, trying to understand what are the 
main drivers that allow developers to set higher prices. According to the available literature on the 
issue and on the observation of behavior in such market, we have hypothesized that apps’ price can 
depend on: degree of developers’ product proliferation and specialization. Furthermore, price 
depends also from thematic categories of the apps, and specifically apps showing two-sided 
network externalities have lower price. In order to test our hypothesis we have collected data from  
68,220 apps of the Italian Apple Store. The empirical analysis full supports our hypotheses. 
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Table 5: Price ranking of thematic categories 
	  
B Average price 
Category = Medical 4.127 5.5014 
Category = Navigation 2.526 3.8997 
Category = References 1.107 2.4807 
Category = Business 1.049 2.4234 
Category = Finance 0.892 2.2662 
Category = Productivity 0.465 1.8387 
Category = Education 0.202 1.5755 
Category = Sports 0.145 1.5185 
Category = Healthcare&Fitness 0.11 1.4834 
Category = Books 0.064 1.438 
Category = Photography 0.008 1.3819 
Category = Travel 0 1.3739 
Category = Music -0.039 1.3344 
Category = Utilities -0.364 1.0096 
Category = Weather -0.524 0.8498 
Category = Lifestyle -0.585 0.7891 
Category = Games -0.614 0.7595 
Category = Social Networking -0.727 0.6464 
Category = Entertainment -0.768 0.6054 
Category = News -0.85 0.5235 
 
 
 
We think this research can provide a contribution to the mobile commerce value chain research 
stream and, particularly, it provides one of the first contributions regarding the Apple’s Application 
Store model.  
 18 
Also, from a managerial point of view, the result obtained in this research can represent useful 
guideline for the thousands of developers that are interested to this emerging market. Indeed, while 
Gartner forecast shows how it can be a very profitable market (Gartner 2010), it is to be said, 
according to Holzer and Ondrus (2010), that there are also many threats arising from several 
opposing technology trends. In this context we consider that this work can provide a good approach 
to better face this emerging market.   
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